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Abstract
Background: Inter-organizaƟ onal healthcare businesses are 
ruled by a huge set of policies: legal policies, organizaƟ onal 
policies, medical policies, ethical policies, etc., which 
are quite staƟ c, paƟ ents policy and process, social and 
environmental condiƟ ons, which are highly dynamic. In the 
context of a business case, those diﬀ erent policies must be 
harmonized to enable privilege management and access 
control decisions.
Objec? ves: The authors oﬀ er a methodology to achieve 
interoperability through policies harmonizaƟ on in a 
privilege management and access control soluƟ on for 
EHR systems, to be later on implemented in a cancer care 
network using HL7 specifi caƟ ons.
Methods: To meet the objecƟ ve, the authors make use of 
a system-theoreƟ cal, architecture-centric, ontology-based 
approach to formally represenƟ ng the aforemenƟ oned 
polices for harmonizaƟ on.
Results: Because of its fl exibility and generality, a policy-
driven RBAC model is used to formally represent all the 
other access control models such as MAC, DAC, RBAC, 
ABAC, HL7 Data SegmentaƟ on and Labeling Services. All the 
policies deployed in the context of an inter-organizaƟ onal 
collaboraƟ on for cancer care can be formalized and then 
harmonized.
Conclusions: The authors provide an implementaƟ on-
independent methodology to enable policies harmonizaƟ on 
in EHR systems. The methodology described in the paper 
is independent on the maturity of organizaƟ ons’ privilege 
management and access control system. Furthermore, 
it does not hamper organizaƟ ons progressing to more 
advanced soluƟ ons over the Ɵ me. Even dynamic policies 
can be harmonized at run Ɵ me, allowing advancement 
towards a paƟ ent-centered care.
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1 Introduc? on
Th e University of Genoa – supported by the Institute 
of Social Medicine and Health Economy at the University 
of Magdeburg, Germany – currently engages in the 
establishment of a cancer care network combining regional 
healthcare establishments at primary, secondary and 
tertiary care level. Breast cancer is the most frequent type 
of cancer, establishing 30% of the cancers females in Italy are 
suff ering from [1]. In females, it is the fi rst cause of death [2]. 
Breast cancer care is a multi-disciplinary challenge involving 
diff erent specialties and units in a hospital, but can also cross-
organizationally include diff erent hospitals, clinics, practices 
and laboratories. 
For improving quality and effi  ciency of care delivery, 
health systems around the globe are evolving towards 
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inter-organizational, inter-regional and even international 
communication and cooperation, increasingly based on 
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems.
Two of the most important prerequisites to inter-
organizational collaboration are security and privacy 
for establishing trust between the actors involved in the 
business case including the patient. Security aims at 
guaranteeing information availability, confi dentiality, 
integrity, authenticity and accountability. Privacy is a human 
right for self-determination, respecting legal requirements, 
ethical principles, personal preferences and expectations 
regarding collection, processing, communication and use 
of personal data, thereby preventing harm from disclosure 
of that personal information [3]. One of the key elements to 
provide security and privacy is privilege management and 
access control to information and functionalities. Figure 1 
illustrates the schema of a general access control system [4].
Th e business case deals with access to clinical objects 
stored in the EHR, which is not a banal information sharing. 
Permissions have to be managed in a way that only the medical 
staff  involved in the patient care can access a patient’s clinic 
information according to the ‘need to know’ principle. It is 
important to underline that both communication security 
and application security are relevant. Using an EHR system, 
the authors will focus on application security, considering 
communication security as a prerequisite and not healthcare 
specifi c.
In healthcare context, policies that have to be respected are 
a complex mix of legal, organizational, functional, medical, 
social, ethical and technical aspects [3]. In addition, also 
personal wishes, local, timely, contextual and environmental 
constraints have to be considered [5]. We can distinguish 
at least legal and domain-specifi c policies, organizational 
policies, process-related policies as well as personal policies. 
Domain-specifi c policies are, e.g., the Hippocratic Oath, the 
medical code of conduct and ethical principles. Th e patient 
consent is frequently mistakenly called a personal policy. 
However, it is just the agreement or disagreement with an 
organizational policy [6]. For distributed business cases, 
also security and privacy management must be realized 
in a distributed way. Figure 2 presents the policies and the 
conditions defi ning the relation between a physician and 
a patient [7]. Th is is the most complex relation, because 
it involves a large number of policies: legal policies, 
organizational policies, ethical policies, etc., which are 
quite static, the subject of care policy and process, social 
and environment conditions, which are highly dynamic. In 
the context of a business case, those diff erent policies must 
be harmonized to enable privilege management and access 
control decisions. In general, the more the subjects, their 
knowledge, experiences and skills are close and implicitly 
sharable, the easier is policy harmonization.
In this paper, the authors want to off er a system-
theoretical, architecture-centric, ontology-based, policy-
driven approach to achieve interoperability through policies 
harmonization in a privilege management and access control 
solution for EHR systems, to be implemented using HL7 
specifi cations. 
2 Principles and Methodologies
In order to realize appropriate privilege management and 
access control, it is fundamental to fi nd a thorough model, 
which is an abstract representation of that part of the reality 
the business case deals with. Th e authors will deploy system 
theory for that purpose. 
A system is group/composition of elements separated 
from the environment according to properties or needs in 
the context of a business process. A system could be a part 
of a super-system, or it can be split in subsystems. A system 
could be analyzed in two diff erent ways, resulting in the 
black box approach and the white box approach. Th e black 
box approach assesses the system’s input-output functional 
relationship. With this approach, we can describe the overall 
function of the system without understanding the internal 
processes and the reasons behind. To carry out greater 
control, it is necessary to move from the black box to the 
Figure 1: Access control system [4].
Figure 2: pHealth interoperability schema [7].
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white box approach. With the white box analysis, a system is 
conceived as a collection of interrelated elements. Th at way, a 
system is more than just the sum of its components. A system 
can be represented through its architecture, describing the 
elements that compose the system, their functions and 
relationships. Th e complete understanding of structure, 
function and relationships of the system elements allows 
controlling the system itself. Th e set of rules that controls the 
behavior of the system is named policy. For managing a quite 
complex business case, the authors have to use the white box 
approach.
An ontology is a formal “explicit specifi cation of a 
conceptualization” [8] of the domain of interest. An ontology 
defi nes a controlled vocabulary and represents domain 
knowledge in a formal and structured form. It consists 
of concepts, concept defi nitions and relations between 
those concepts. A formal description decreases language 
ambiguity. It allows to make domain assumption explicit, to 
share knowledge between agents, to re-use and to analyze 
knowledge [9, 10].
3 Results
In a business process, an entity requests access to some 
information objects. Th e purpose of privilege management 
is to provide the permissions, if any, the entity has, deciding 
on when, where, why, for which purpose, how, under which 
conditions. Th en, according to the assigned permissions, the 
request of access to the resource has to be permitted, denied 
or modifi ed (as instance veiling some information).
In order to guarantee an appropriate privilege 
management and access control, a prior observation of the 
business is fundamental. Th rough observation, interpretation 
and understanding of the system, its relationships and its 
rules can be derived and represented as knowledge. Accepted 
ontologies enable creation, representation and management 
of the knowledge about the domain of interest in a consistent, 
reasonably expressive and formalized way that properly 
refl ects the reality. 
For realizing interoperability, i.e. advanced 
communication and cooperation, the diff erent policies 
must be harmonized. If policies are static and can therefore 
be predefi ned, policy harmonization can be performed in 
advance by coordinating or aligning policies relevant for the 
predefi ned business case in the design and defi nition phase 
already. Th is is, e.g., the case when defi ning, negotiating and 
contracting disease management programs (DMPs). We 
must have in mind however the impossibility of predefi ning 
any thinkable policy harmonization, e.g. in open care settings 
and personalized health, as some of the policies to be applied 
are not known at that time. Furthermore and even more 
relevant, the consideration of any thinkable policy would 
make the system too complex, and therefore undefi ned and 
not computable. In consequence, we should only consider 
policies relevant for the corresponding business case. If the 
harmonization of business case related policies cannot be 
performed in advance, it has to be performed at run time, 
using decision intelligence systems for security and privacy 
services, especially for a specifi c privilege management. 
Dynamic policy harmonization can be performed by a 
system-theoretical, architecture-centric, ontology-based, 
policy-driven approach.
Figure 3 shows the policy-driven RBAC schema, which is 
provided by ISO 22600 [6].
In this schema, the principal is the user who wants 
to access a resource (an information object as target or a 
service). Th e structural role is the role assigned to the user 
by the organization, such as head physician, medical doctor, 
nurse, etc., but also specifi c qualifi cations or competences. 
Th e structural roles policy represents the relationships within 
the organization and is quite static. Th e process policy is the 
set of rules that control the business process. In the healthcare 
context, a process policy can be established through clinic 
guidelines or best practice guidelines. Th e functional role 
is the role that the user has related to the process, which is 
connected to the actions he/she can perform on resources in 
a certain process act, e.g. ordering an observation, justifying 
a statement by signature, or prescribing a medication, so 
becoming a requester, signer, prescriber. In the business case 
described, the target policy is strongly infl uenced by the fact 
that information objects are clinic information stored in the 
EHR. Th anks to its fl exibility, this model is able to formally 
represent all the other access control models. Th is means that 
in the context of an inter-organizational collaboration all the 
policies can be formalized and then harmonized without 
touching them. So, cross-organizational interoperability can 
be provided irrespective of the access control level and the 
underlying access control model of the single organization. 
Th e model in Figure 3 can be extended by top level policies 
any business is bound to such as legislation, ethical rules, 
etc. In order to harmonize policies, it is necessary to obtain a 
consistent formalization of the policies themselves. 
Figure 3: Policy-driven RBAC schema [6].
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Following the policies, rules can be applied to assign 
privileges to actors or to roles played by actors. While the 
fi rst case allows binding static policies to individual actors, 
the second enables an easier manageable rather coarse-
grained binding of policies to roles, which in the worst case 
are structural roles and therefore static. When considering 
functional (predefi ned) roles, the business process defi nes the 
roles and privileges assignment to an entity. As an outcome, 
we implement statically Access Control Lists (ACLs), 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC), or Role Based Access Control (RBAC). 
HL7 provides a special policy-driven solution for 
managing security and privacy in a business case and 
an individual context, and for deciding on that basic on 
privileges at runtime. Within the US national project of data 
segmentation for advancing communication and cooperation 
between healthcare establishments, HL7 has specifi ed the 
HL7 Healthcare Privacy and Security Classifi cation System 
(HCS) – Release 1 [11]. Th is specifi cation defi nes security 
labels as markers bound to a resource, which connect an 
information object, but also process steps or actions, to a set 
of security and privacy attributes. Th is solution has already 
been demonstrated at diff erent HIMSS events [5, 12].
Th e HL7 Healthcare Privacy and Security Classifi cation 
System consists of two parts: 
• A context-sensitive segmentation of health 
information;
• Security and privacy labeling of data segments, 
enabling machine processing of privilege 
management and access control. 
In HCS specifi cation, security labels are defi ned as meta-
data bound to resources that transmit constraints on the use 
of the resources. Security labels are applied based on risk 
assessment of harm resulting from unauthorized disclosure. 
“Th is assessment may refl ect personal perceptions or legal 
requirements, which may involve inherently emotional 
characterization of clinical information as prejudicial to a 
party’s “interests” when exposed in unauthorized ways or to 
those who lack authority and responsibility for its care and 
use” [11]. With the implicit knowledge stored in security 
labels as “mini policy”, privilege management and access 
control decisions can be performed without accessing the 
target information. Th e label refers to the explicit policy 
stored in a policy repository to be accessed when needed for 
interpretation as explained in some more detail as follows. 
NIST FIPS PUB 188 specifi cation defi nes a security 
label as a set of specifi ed fi elds. Each fi eld consists of 
globally unique Tag Set Name and a set of semantically 
interoperable security tag or fi eld values. Th ese labels 
defi ne the classifi cation of each item. HL7 HCS specifi es a 
Security Classifi cation Tag Set (Confi dentiality), a Security 
Categorization Tag Set (Sensitivity, Integrity, Compartment, 
Privacy Law), and Handling Caveat Tag Set (Purpose of Use, 
Obligations, Refrain Policies). In the following, the label 
fi elds will be introduced in some details [13]: 
• Confi dentiality: classifi es an IT resource (clinical fact, 
data, information object, service, or system capability) 
according to its level of sensitivity, which is based on 
an analysis of applicable privacy policies and the risk of 
fi nancial, reputational, or other harm to an individual 
that could result from unauthorized disclosure; 
• Sensitivity: categorizes the value, importance and 
vulnerability of an IT resource perceived as undesirable 
to share; 
• Integrity: conveys the completeness, veracity, reliability, 
trustworthiness and provenance of an IT resource; 
• Compartment: "segments" an IT resource by indicating 
that access and use is restricted to members of a defi ned 
community or project. An example for compartment 
labels is “for pharmacy only”; 
• Privacy Law: refers to the corresponding legislation; 
• Handling Caveat: conveys dissemination controls and 
information handling caveats, such as constraining 
the purpose of use, defi ning concrete refrain policies 
and obligations to which an IT resource custodian or 
receiver must comply. 
Confi dentiality, Sensitivity, Integrity and Compartment 
fi elds characterize security and privacy rules (“mini 
policies”) for specifi c health information. Instead, handling 
caveat fi elds are characteristics of activities, such as processes 
of using that information. Th e valid security labels and how 
they have to be compared with the users’ clearances have 
to be expressed as explicit policies specifi ed in the Security 
Policy Information Files (SPIF). Th e SPIF are usually XML 
based [5].
Th e newest project established at HL7 for privilege 
management and access control is the draft  specifi cation 
“Privacy and Security Architecture Framework – Trust 
Framework for Federated Authorization, Release 1. Being 
more consistent with the prosed methodology than older 
specifi cations, also this model can be represented and 
harmonized with others following the presented approach 
[14].
For managing and harmonizing the diff erent privilege 
management and access control models, Figure 3 is used as 
Reference Architecture Model of the privilege management 
and access control system. For that purpose, all those models 
have to be architecturally represented in that schema. 
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All the diff erent policies provided by the diff erent 
solutions presented have to be considered for the specifi c 
privilege assignment and access control decisions. For 
concluding on all those policies, the concepts have to be 
provided at a level of expressivity and formalization allowing 
that all concepts established by domain experts or laymen 
from diff erent domains in diff erent context with diff erent 
education, experiences and skills can be appropriately and 
consistently taken into consideration. For that purpose, 
the concepts of the policy domain have been ordered and 
interrelated in the policy domain ontology as described in 
ISO 22600 [6]. Additionally to the defi nition of the base 
classes of that ontology and their structural relations, the 
latter must be quantifi ed using a proper logic representation. 
Th e knowledge (concept) processing in the decision making 
process is based on an ontology harmonization process. 
An extended study of relevant tools to perform this task is 
underway as well.
More details related to access control models and their 
policies formalization will be presented in [15].
For implementing the policy decision process, existing 
standards and related services can be used as shortly 
discussed in the following.
Within the scope of the HCS and its use in an access 
control system, there are two principal services: the Security 
Labeling Service (SLS) and the Privacy and Protective 
Services (PPS) [16]. Th e SLS evaluates the submitted 
clinical information objects, including clinical tagging 
and provenance, to determine the appropriate security 
labels to assign to information objects for access control 
based on rules. Access Decision Services can then use the 
labeled clinical objects as classifi ed resource Access Control 
Decision Information (ADI) to check clearances. Access 
decision policy can be dynamic, particularly in the case 
of patient preferences. For this reason, labels should be 
applied at runtime, rather than being permanently stored 
with information objects. In this way, classifi ed resource 
ADI could be current with the most current policy. Th e 
SLS is supported by a Security Label Management System. 
Th e latter establishes, provisions, and manages the security 
tagging vocabularies and security labeling rules needed to 
support jurisdictional, organizational privacy and security 
policies, including patient consent directives. Once an access 
control decision is made, also obligations should be met 
before releasing the resources. Th en, the Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) decision and obligations are provided to a Policy 
Figure 4: Authorization Reference Model [18].
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Enforcement Point (PEP), which tasks appropriate obligation 
services, such as PPS, to impose the obligations. Basing upon 
rules, the PPS can apply various transforms to the security 
labeled resources: masking, redaction, shedding, shift ing, 
annotations, anonymization, pseudo-anonymization, 
etc. Th e PPS is supported by its own Protective Services 
Management Sub-System, which establishes the type of 
transformations to be applied based upon rules. Th e latter 
can be determined in advance or dynamically at runtime. 
Th e transformed resource is fi nally sent to the recipient [5]. 
Once users’ clearances, resources security labels and 
SPIF are defi ned, privilege and access control management 
in health information systems can be automated [5]. 
For implementing the aforementioned advanced service, 
the HL7 Implementation Guide: Data Segmentation for 
Privacy (DS4P) as well as HL7 Version 3 Standard: Privacy, 
Access and Security Services; Security Labeling Service 
[16, 17] have been specifi ed. Th is Implementation Guide, 
including the value defi nitions and references, must be 
localized for the Italian environment. Figure 4 presents the 
Access Control logical architecture model [18].
4 Deployment of the Developed Methodology
Th e aforementioned privilege management and 
access control models refer to predefi ned policies in 
their informational representation. As the informational 
representation is usually defi ned by informaticians, the 
consistency with real world policies cannot be guaranteed. 
Th e solution off ered by the paper is overcoming those 
limitations by:
• Th e defi nition of all policies relevant for a 
specifi c business case using the domain specifi c 
terminologies;
• Th e formal representation of those policies using the 
domain specifi c ontologies;
• Th e harmonization of real world policies at runtime. 
 Th en, it is intuitive that static and rigid policies are not 
suitable. Instead, policies coming from diff erent domains 
have to be mapped dynamically and in an adaptive and 
automated way. In order to allow this, it is essential to 
provide a formal description of the policies that can be used 
by the authorization services to obtain the security and 
privacy rules to apply to the resources [19]. Furthermore, 
the environment conditions have to be evaluated in the same 
moment in which the user makes the access request. To 
implement an access control  
• To service functionalities: it is necessary to make 
a functional description of the service, specifying 
security and privacy minimum requirements for 
each functionality through security labels, or at the 
next level by dynamically representing the related 
explicit policy; 
• To the resources: the resources have to be classifi ed 
through security labels, or at the next level by 
dynamically representing the related explicit policy. 
Th rough the description of the security and privacy 
labels (or the explicit policies) of processes and resources, 
the authorization service is able to obtain the policy to be 
applied and to check the resulting constraints at runtime. 
As mentioned above, the policies that have to be mapped 
come from diff erent domains. So, policies must be formally 
expressed for allowing their integration in advanced e-health 
environments. Since diff erent expression means will be 
used to formally modelling policies, measures and tools 
for expressing and mapping them have to be developed. 
Interoperability between diff erent domains requires 
ontology management by harmonizing common ontology 
domains’ sub-ontologies (e.g. harmonizing concepts of 
medical sub-ontologies such as SNOMED and LOINC) or by 
linking diff erent domains’ ontologies (e.g. linking policy and 
medical concepts or linking legal policy and medical policy). 
Harmonizing ontologies can be performed a-priori by 
merging, aligning, integrating, or at runtime by matching or 
mapping. Matching addresses the management of equivalent 
concepts, while mapping addresses the management of 
similar concepts. As ontologies are used to represent 
architectural components of the Generic Component Model 
(GCM) at appropriate level of generalization/specialization, 
the GCM process principles also apply to the ontology 
management (e.g., only interrelating concepts at the same 
level of granularity). 
5 Discussion
In this paper, the authors off er a solution for policy 
harmonization for privilege management and access 
control in healthcare context to be implemented using HL7 
specifi cations. Personal health information and related 
process information will be managed using the Italian 
Fascicolo Sanitario Elettronico (FSE). Th e FSE is a regional 
EHR approach to collect clinical data and documents 
produced by present or past clinical events and constitutes 
the patient clinical history. Th e FSE can be accessed through 
the Internet with appropriate security and privacy measures 
in place. Th e patient can have access to his/her FSE through 
personal credentials or a smartcard [20].
In order to guarantee adequate privilege management 
and access control, it is necessary to identify the subjects who 
request to access to the resources. For this reason, the solution 
must include an authentication service. Th e authors focused 
on authorization services, supposing that an adequate system 
for identifi cation and authentication already exists. Th is 
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assumption is justifi ed by the current Italian governmental 
eff ort to set up a national identity system called Sistema 
Pubblico di Identità Digitale (SPID), Public System of Digital 
Identity [21]. As its name suggests, the SPID is a national 
service that provides a digital identity for Italian citizens. Th e 
latter are identifi ed through the fi scal code (Codice Fiscale), 
which is an alphanumeric code of sixteen characters that is 
associated to Italian individuals at birth and to foreigners 
when having contacts with Italian institutions. Th e fi scal 
code depends on the subject’s name, surname, sex, place and 
date of birth and is unique and tailored for the person. Up 
to now, the SPID supplies two levels of authentication [22]. 
At the fi rst level, one factor authentication is provided by a 
password. At the second level, two factor authentication is 
provided by a password and a One Time Password. During 
2017, a more secure two factor authentication, provided 
through a password and a physical medium (such as a 
smart card) should be available for fi rst services. Eff orts 
similar to the SPID are also performed in other European 
countries with the opportunity of cross-border use, see 
the Electronic identifi cation and electronic Trust Services 
(eIDAS) regulation [23, 24]. However, a strong and secure 
three factor authentication is fundamental for activities as 
awkward as healthcare.
In Italy, healthcare organizations have diff erent access 
control models: in some organizations access control is 
static, rigid and strongly hierarchy dependent (MAC); in 
others authorized subjects can delegate permissions to other 
users (DAC); in rare cases, it is possible to fi nd a role based 
privilege management (RBAC). All of these solutions have 
been the result of past investments of money and in many 
cases organizations have not the possibility to make progress 
towards more advanced access control. Th e methodology 
provided by the authors enables at run time the harmonization 
of all the policies irrespective of the access control model 
used in the organizations. Th is off ers the opportunity to 
consider also patient policies, which are strongly dynamic, 
that way enabling the move from an organization-centered 
care to a patient-centered care. In addition, since all the 
access control models can be formally represented with 
the schema in Figure 3, the methodology does not hamper 
organizations progressing to more advanced privilege 
management and access control solutions. Th ese are the 
advantages of the authors’ approach over other solutions that 
enable harmonization only by static pre-coordination or even 
require the use of identical or at least equivalent solutions. As 
a consequence of such pre-coordination, only organizations 
with the stated access control model can join the intra-
organizational collaboration. In addition, since policies are 
not harmonized at run time, a predefi ned solution can fi t 
only organization centered healthcare.
6 Conclusion
Th e authors provide a methodology to enable policies 
harmonization in EHR systems by deploying a system-
theoretical, architecture-centric, ontology-based, policy-
driven approach, which:
• Is irrespective of the maturity of organizations 
privilege management and access control system;
• Does not hamper organizations progressing to more 
advanced privilege management and access control 
system over the time;
• Accepts also dynamic policies;
• Allows to advance towards a patient-centered care;
• Is implementation-independent.
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